Young's characterization of the Shapley value is considered. A new proof of this axiomatization is presented, moreover, as applications of the new proof, it is demonstrated that the axioms under consideration characterize the Shapley value on various well-known subclasses of T U games.
Introduction
In this paper we look into one of the well-known characterizations of the Shapley value [7] , into Young's [8] axiomatization. The Shapley value is probably the most popular one-point solution of transferable utility (T U ) cooperative games (henceforth games). It is applied in various fields ranging from medicine to statistics, from engineering to accounting etc. Therefore a solid characterization could well serve, among others, applications by helping in understanding its very nature.
Young axiomatized the Shapley value with three axioms: efficiency (Pareto optimality P O), symmetry or equal treatment property ET P (although symmetry and ET P are different axioms, they are equivalent on the class of T U games), and strong monotonicity. Later Moulin [3] suggested another proof for Young's result for the three player case. Both Young's and Moulin's results are applied to the whole class of T U games, however Young also showed that the given characterization is valid on the class of superadditive games as well.
With respect to other subclasses on which Young's result is valid we have to mention three other papers. Neyman [5] showed that for any game, a value defined on the additive group generated by the given game, is efficient (P O), symmetric (or ET P ), and strongly monotonic if and only if it is the Shapley value. Khmelnitskaya [1] provided the same result for the class of non-negative constant-sum games with non-zero worth of grand coalition and for the entire class of constant-sum games. Moroever, Mlodak [2] applied the same method as Khmelnitskaya to characterize the Shapley value on the class of non-negative bilateral games.
The main motivation of this paper is mathematical. We provide a new proof for Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value. Our new proof makes it possible to prove the validity of Young's characterization of the Shapley value on some other subclasses of games not considered in the literature yet.
The setup of the paper is as follows. In Section 2., we introduce the terminology used throughout the paper. Section 3. discusses our main result. Moreover, some proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Preliminaries
First, some notation: |N | is for the cardinality of set N , and 2
N denotes the set of all subsets of N . A ⊂ B means A ⊆ B, but A = B. Moreover, we use |a| as well for the absolute value of a real number a ∈ R.
Let N = ∅, |N | < ∞, and v : 2 N → R be such a function that v(∅) = 0. Then N , v are called set of players, and transferable utility cooperative game (henceforth game) respectively. The class of games with players' set N is denoted by G N . Let v ∈ G N and i ∈ N be arbitrarily fixed, and ∀S ⊆ N :
In this paper, along with G N , we consider also subclasses of games defined
For the definition of an essential game cf. von Neumann and Morgenstern [4] , and for other types of games cf. Peleg and Sudhölter [6] .
It is well known that an equivalent definition of (strictly) convex / (strictly) concave games might be given as following:
It is easy to verify that for any game v ∈ G N : ∼ v is a binary equivalence relation on N × N .
Furthermore, if S ⊆ N is such that ∀i, j ∈ S: i ∼ v j, then we say that S is an equivalence class in v.
Next we summarize some important properties of dual games. For arbitrary game v ∈ G N :
Furthermore, the dual of a (strictly) convex game is a (strictly) concave game, and the dual of a (strictly) concave game is a (strictly) convex game. (2) Throughout the paper we consider single-valued solutions. A function ψ :
where φ i (v) is also called player i's Shapley value [7] . The solution ψ on A ⊆ G N is / satisfies
Remark 2.1. It is very important to note that the Shapley solution is (completely) determined by the marginal contribution functions. Therefore we can claim that for any EM P solution ψ:
It is well known and not difficult to check that the Shapley solution is P O, ET P , and EM P .
The main result
In this section we present our main result. The following example illustrates the strategy of the proof of Theorem 3.3.
. Then v is a superadditive but not convex game, and 1
Fix player 1 and chose player 2. Then there is such a game w = (0, 0, 0, 3, 2, 2, 4) that w
(it is clear that, w is not the only game in which players 1 and 2 are equivalent and w
Next take set {1, 2} and chose player 3. Then there is such a game z = (0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 3) that z
From Example 3.1. it is clear that we can deduce ψ i = φ i for any i (player). In other words, we can show that ψ(v) = φ(v). All we need is that, ψ must be defined on the paths from v to z (different w and z for different i).
The next notion is an important ingredient of our main theorem.
and ∀k ∈ N \ S: ∃w ∈ A such that S ∪ {k} is an equivalence class in w and w
The following theorem is our main result.
Theorem 3.3. Let set A ⊆ G
N be such that ∀v ∈ A, ∀k ∈ N , and ∀i ∈ N \ {k}: ∃B ⊆ A, ∃w ∈ A, and ∃z(i) ∈ B such that
Then ψ a solution on A is P O, ET P , and EM P if and only if ψ = φ.
The above theorem is not tight. Consider e.g. the subclass of three player games, N = {1, 2, 3}, which contains only three games: the zero game, the unanimity game on coalition {1, 2} u {1,2} , and v = (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2). It is a slight calculation to show that this class does not meet the conditions of Theorem 3.3., but axioms P O, ET P , and EM P characterize the Shapley value on it.
The proof of Theorem 3.3. if : It is well-known.
only if: Let v ∈ A be arbitrarily fixed, and n = |N |. Moreover, let i 1 ∈ N be arbitrarily fixed and i 2 ∈ N \ {i 1 } be also arbitrarily fixed. Let B be an EM P -closed class of games as in the head of the theorem, i.e. it depends on v and i 1 , furthermore, let z ∈ B be arbitrarily fixed.
B is EM P -closed therefore ∃z(1) ∈ B such that z(1)
B is EM P -closed therefore ∃z(2) ∈ B such that z(2)
. . .
B is EM P -closed therefore ∃z(n − 1) ∈ B such that z(n − 1)
and {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n } (= N ) is an equivalence class in z(n − 1). By P O and ET P , ψ(z(n − 1)) = φ(z(n − 1)) because all players i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n are symmetric in z(n − 1).
Since both values ψ and φ meet EM P and by construction z(n − 1)
) and φ in (z(n − 2)) = φ in (z(n − 1)) by applying EM P twice to two different games with respect to two different solutions. Next, all players i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n−1 are symmetric in the game z(n − 2), whence by ET P and P O it holds that ψ(z(n − 2)) = φ(z(n − 2)).
By applying a similar reasoning as above, and by employing that i n−2 was arbitrarily chosen, we get ψ(z(n − 3)) = φ(z(n − 3)).
Then that, i 2 ∈ N \ {i 1 } was arbitrarily fixed, ψ is defined on B, it is P O and EM P imply that ψ(z) = φ(z).
Let k = i 1 , w, z(i) be as in the head of the theorem. Since ∀i ∈ N \ {i 1 }:
ψ(z) = φ(z), ψ is defined on A, and it is P O and EM P , therefore ψ(w) = φ(w). w
, and ψ is EM P , hence ψ i1 (v) = φ i1 (v). i 1 was arbitrarily fixed, therefore ψ(v) = φ(v).
Q.E.D.
Next, we show that the above theorem implements Young's [8] result. To prove Theorem 3.4. it is enough to show that G N is EM P -closed.
First we prove the next lemma. 
Proof. if: It is left for the reader.
only if: W.l.o.g. we can assume that T \ Z = ∅, and let T \ Z = {l 1 , . . . , l m } and Z \ T = {q 1 , . . . , q m }. Since T \ Z ⊆ S and Z \ T ⊆ S, S is an equivalence class in v, hence ∀i,
Next, we consider a direct corollary of Lemma 3.6.
Corollary 3.7. Let v ∈ G N be arbitrarily fixed, S ⊆ N be an equivalence class in v, and k ∈ N \ S be also arbitrarily fixed. Then ∀T, Z ⊆ N such that
The proof of Proposition 3.5. Let v ∈ G
N be such that S ⊂ N is an equivalence class in v, and k ∈ N \ S be arbitrarily fixed.
If T = ∅ then let w(T ) = 0. If T ∩ (S ∪ {k}) = ∅, T = ∅ then let w(T ) be arbitrarily fixed. In the other cases (T ∩ (S ∪ {k}) = ∅), let
where m = |(S ∪ {k}) ∩ T |, and l i ∈ S ∩ T , i = 1, . . . , m − 1. Notice that from Next, we show that Young's axiomatization is also valid on all the considered subclasses of games.
Theorem 3.8. ψ a solution on the class of essential / (strictly) convex / (strictly) superadditive / (strictly) weakly superadditive / (strictly) monotonic / additive / (strictly) weakly subadditive / (strictly) subadditive / (strictly) concave games is P O, ET P , and EM P if and only if ψ = φ.
In order to apply Theorem 3.3 we need the following lemmata (the proofs are relegated to the Appendix):
Lemma 3.9. The class of the strictly convex / additive / strictly concave games is EM P -closed. 
The proof of Theorem 3.8. See Theorem 3.3., and Lemmata 3.9., 3.10., 3.11.
The importance of Lemmata 3.10. and 3.11. is that not all the considered classes of games are EM P -closed.
Remark 3.12. The proof of Lemma 3.9. shows that the classes of (strictly) convex, (strictly) weakly superadditive, (strictly) monotonic, additive, (strictly) weakly subadditive, (strictly) concave games are EM P -closed. It is common in these games that they can be characterized completely by the properties of the players' marginal contribution functions. This fact is responsible for that their classes are EM P -closed.
However, the classes of essential, (strictly) superadditive, (strictly) subadditive games are not EM P -closed. The next example shows this fact. Remark 3.14. If |N | ≤ 3 then the classes of (strictly) superadditive, (strictly) subadditive games coincide with the classes of (strictly) weakly superadditive, (strictly) weakly subadditive games respectively, hence they are EM P -closed. Furthermore, if |N | = 2 then the class of essential games coincides with the class of strictly superadditive games, hence it is EM P -closed.
Appendix
The proof of Lemma 3.9. Let v ∈ G N be such that S ⊂ N is an equivalence class in v, and k ∈ N \ S be arbitrarily fixed. The proof of Lemma 3.5. shows that ∃w ∈ G N such that S ∪ {k} is an equivalence class in w and w
Therefore, the only thing we have to do (except the trivial case of additive games) is to show that we can give such values to these coalitions that w be in the considered class of games.
(1) The class of additive games: It is well known that game z ∈ G N is additive if and only if ∀i ∈ N : ∃c i ∈ R such that ∀T ⊆ N \ {i}:
It is easy to see that w
, w is additive, and N is an equivalence class in w.
(2) The class of strictly convex games: Game z ∈ G N is strictly convex if and
where T ∩ (S ∪ {k}) = ∅, T = ∅, and let w(∅) = 0. Let l ∈ N \ (S ∪ {k}) be arbitrarily fixed, and T, Z ⊆ N \ {l} such that Z ⊂ T . Then
where m = |(S ∪{k})∩T |, n = |(S ∪{k})∩Z|, and {l 1 , . . . ,
Notice that, if T \ (S ∪ {k}) = Z \ (S ∪ {k}), then the proof is complete. Therefore, w.l.o.g. we can assume that Z \ (S ∪ {k}) ⊂ T \ (S ∪ {k}). That v is a strictly convex game, S ∪ {k} is an equivalence class in w, and n < |N | imply that
On the other hand, from (5)
Summing up (6) and (7)
and T, Z ⊆ N \ {l}, Z ⊂ T were arbitrarily fixed, hence w is strictly convex. 
Equation (2) implies thatv is a strictly convex game and S is an equivalence class inv. Then from point (2), ∃z strictly convex game such that S ∪ {k} is an equivalence class in z, and z (2)z is a strictly concave game, and S ∪ {k} is an equivalence class in it.
It is a slight calculation to show thatz
The proof of Lemma 3.10 .
where T is such that k / ∈ T , T = ∅, and let w(∅) = 0. If k ∈ T then let w(T ) = w(T \{k})+v ′ k (T \{k}). It is easy to verify that w is an essential / convex / (strictly) superadditive / (strictly) weakly superadditive / (strictly) monotonic game and w
Furthermore, let l ∈ N \ {k}, and T, Z ⊆ N \ {l}, Z ⊂ T be arbitrarily fixed. Then we consider three cases. 
Summing up (9) and (10)
The proofs of the other two cases (k / ∈ T and k ∈ T \ Z) go as above. Let i ∈ N \{k} be arbitrarily fixed. Then we can repeat the above discussion (v = w, k = i) to get z(i). Then z(i) Q.E.D.
The proof of Lemma 3.11 . The class of the (strictly) weakly subadditive / (strictly) subadditive / concave games contains the class of the strictly concave games. It is a slight calculation to show that we can take the dual of any (strictly) weakly subadditive / (strictly) subadditive / concave game, apply Lemma 3.10., and take the duals of the the games produced by Lemma 3.10. (it is worth noticing that the dual of a (strictly) subadditive / (strictly) weakly subadditive game is not necessarily (strictly) superadditive / (strictly) weakly superadditive, e.g. v ⊜ (4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 7) is strictly subadditive, butv is not weakly superadditive; moreover, the dual of a (strictly) superadditive / (strictly) weakly superadditive game is not necessarily (strictly) subadditive / (strictly) weakly subadditive, e.g. v ⊜ (0, 0, 0, 3, 1, 2, 4) is strictly superadditive, butv is not weakly subadditive).
